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Many alternative methods for designing secure information systems (SIS) have been 
proposed to ensure system security. However, within all the literature on SIS methods, 
there exists little theoretically grounded work that addresses the fundamental 
requirements and goals of SIS design. This paper first uses design theory to develop a 
SIS design theory framework that defines six requirements for SIS design methods, and 
second, shows how known SIS design methods fail to satisfy these requirements. Third, 
the paper describes a SIS design method that does address these requirements and 




The increased utilization of information systems (IS) and the Internet has brought 
security issues to the fore. To ensure that systems are secured, researchers have 
constructed various SIS design methods (see review articles by Baskerville, 1993; 
Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Siponen, 2005a). But reviewers find a fundamental 
problem with these SIS design methods: they are theoretically underdeveloped 
(Baskerville, 1992 p. 410; Willison, 2002 p. 15), “lacking serious research” (Baskerville, 
1994 p. 385), or are glutted with “nonsense” (Olnes, 1994 p. 628). As the design theory 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Kalle Lyytinen was the Senior Accepting editor of this paper. This paper was submitted on 
December 3PrdP 2002 and went through 2 revisions. 
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approach has proved successful in prescribing better design processes for emergent 
classes of systems (Walls, et al. 2004), reframing development of SIS design methods 
as a design science activity is a promising way to advance past this problem. TPF2FPT  
The purpose of this paper is to describe the development of a fundamental SIS design 
theory à la Walls et al. (1992).  This theory prescribes six requirements, called meta-
requirements, for SIS design methods. Through an analysis of the extent to which prior 
SIS design methods address the six meta-requirements, we learn that none of the 
existing methods address all six. The SIS design theory enables us to advance a SIS 
design method, called Meta-notation, which does address the six SIS meta-
requirements, and we are able to validate this solution (Meta-notation) through action 
research. These results contribute to the IS research community with a novel and 
promising basis for SIS design methods thinking, and the successful action research 
intervention demonstrates the practical value of the resulting SIS design methods for 
practitioners.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the design theory for 
SIS design methods with six meta-requirements and reviews the extent to which extant 
SIS design methods meet these requirements. The third section describes the 
background of the new solution, and the fourth section illustrates how it can be applied 
to an Information Systems Development (ISD) method. In the fifth section, we describe 
the research approach used. The sixth section presents the preliminary clinical fieldwork 
findings, while the seventh section presents the action research findings. Section eight is 
a discussion, including the implications of the study. Finally, the last section concludes 
with a summary of the key findings.  
SIS Design Theory And SIS Design Method Meta-Requirements 
 
Walls et al. (1992) envisaged design theories as prescriptive (how to design) and goal-
oriented; thus they differ from predictive or explanatory natural science theories. An IS 
design theory is divided into two aspects; design and product, and consists of a set of 
meta-requirements, which are derived from relevant kernel or reference theories (Figure 
1). The meta-requirements also inform meta-design principles. A set of testable design 
product hypotheses is used to test whether the meta-design meets the meta-
requirements. In turn, the testable design process hypotheses are utilized to verify 
whether the design method results in an artifact that is consistent with the meta-design. 
Both positivistic and interpretive research methods could be used to test these 







                                                 
TP
2
PT Other areas have encountered dissimilar, but fundamental problems in proposed design theory solutions, 
such as Executive Information Systems (Walls et al., 1992), Decision Support Systems (Kasper, 1996), 
Knowledge Management (Markus et al., 2002) and Web-based Education (Jones et al., 2003). Working 
from Simon’s (1996) Science of the Artificial, Walls et al. (1992) provided the seminal expression of 
design theory for IS. 
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Figure 1. An IS design theory (adapted from Walls et al., 1992) that elaborates the 
design method into process and notation. and the design hypotheses into two 
areas: (a) validity of the method meta-requirements; (b) the design method fidelity 
to the method meta-design principles.  
 
SIS Design Theory: An Elaboration 
 
Design theory adapts well to different contexts, but for good fit it requires elaboration or 
modification in other instances (Kasper, 1996; Markus et al., 2002). We found this to be 
the case in SIS design, and we elaborated the design theory framework by Walls et al. 
(1992) in two ways. First, we divided the design method into separate process and 
notation aspects, following similar critical work on ISD methods (Hirschheim and Klein, 
1992; Gause and Weinberg, 1989). This elaboration is useful because our aims included 
the development of concepts for creating situated SIS design methods. Second, 
because our focus is on the design process aspect, we divided the design meta-
methodological hypotheses into two areas: (a) validity of the method meta-
requirements, TPF3FPT and (b) fidelity of the SIS design method to the meta-design principles.  
 
                                                 
TP
3
PT The a-type of hypotheses means that a SIS design method incorporating meta-requirements is assumed to 
be more successful in practice than a SIS design method that does not have such features. This success is 
evaluated in terms of practitioners’ preferences. So, for example, with respect to modeling support (see MR 
2 below), practitioners in general are assumed to prefer SIS design methods that offer modeling support at 
three levels of abstraction over a SIS that does not provide such support. 
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We will focus on the design process aspect of design theory. The product aspect, as 
described by Walls et al. (1992), is most applicable in generic, off-the-shelf software. 
Such design products must themselves be examined for generality, and thus themselves 
draw upon kernel theories and meta-principles. However, our focus is on the most 
widespread SIS design problem: SIS for a particular organization’s system or setting. In 
such design settings, the security requirements of the product (SIS or software) are 
highly situated, and are determined mainly by the client. Recognizing this, we draw the 
meta-principles into the design process aspect and concentrate only on the design 
aspect in our study, represented by the right-hand part of Figure 1. 
 
The design process aspect guides the construction of the product. According to Walls et 
al. (1992), a design method, based on the idea of the IS design theory, can focus on any 
stage of ISD (e.g., requirements analysis, implementation, testing). Next, we describe six 
SIS design method meta-requirements and respective kernel theories, starting from the 
fundamental kernel theory. 
 
SIS Design Theory: Fundamental Kernel Theory  
 
Clements (1977) developed a theory of SIS based on a model of the relationship 
between a set of system objects (each with a loss value), a set of threats (each with a 
likelihood), and a set of IS security features (each with a resistance). The relationship 
involved the association of potential intrusion activities with each relevant member of the 
















These threat-object relations defined a set of edges T Bi BOBj B that represent the components 
of insecurity or risk in systems. Security features provide a “firewall function” (Clements, 
1977 p. 532) that resists penetration of any particular threat through to any particular 
object. In a protected system, any TO edge is eliminated by inserting a feature to 
establish a TF edge and an FO edge in place of the TO edge.  Thus all edges are 
prescribed in the forms T BiBF Bk B and FBkBOBj B that represent the insertion of security features 
between threats and system objects.  In a protected system, all edges T Bi BOBj B are 
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Figure 3. Clements’ basic security system (adapted from Clements 1977). 
 
Clements’ (1977) theory describes the basic relationships between threats and system 
assets, and the intended role of designed controls or safeguards established to prevent 
the effects of threats on assets. This is the fundamental theory aimed at describing the 
heart of SIS design methods, that seeks to specify and deploy safeguards to prevent 
losses due to threats. This theory provides the most basic set of assumptions among the 
kernel theories employed in our design theory. 
 
While Clements’ (1977) theory is sufficient as a basis for the goals of any SIS design 
method, it provides for no features beyond the goals in terms of the basic security threat-
feature-object triplets. In order to address this issue, we draw from a number of other 
theories. These other theories are used as kernel theories in developing the 
requirements for a SIS design method to integrate with other ISD methods. We will 
describe each of these additional kernel theories in the next section. 
 
Table 1: Components of the design aspect and respective SIS features. 
The 
components 
of the design 
aspect 
SIS features 
1. SIS design 
method meta-
requirements 
1.0 A SIS design methods must develop security features that resist the 
impact of threats on system objects. 
1.1 Organizations’ security requirements must be the point of departure in 
the development of SIS.  
1.2 SIS design methods should provide abstract representation and 
operations for specifying the three essential elements of secure systems -  
threats, objects, and security features (safeguards or controls) - for the three 
levels of abstraction: organizational, conceptual and technical.  
1.3 SIS design methods should support its integration into normal ISD 
methods. 
1.4 SIS design methods should maximize the autonomy of developers. 
1.5 SIS design methods should be adaptable to forthcoming ISD methods. 
2. Kernel 
theories  
2.0 Clements’ Threat-Feature-Object Model 
2.1 Hume’s law “no ought from (an) is”. 
2.2 Metamodels of IS. 
2.3 The theory of developmental duality, Ockham's razor and the thesis of 
ontological dependencies. 
2.4 Autonomy in philosophy. 
2.5 Emergence: autopoesis and self-reproduction. 




3.0 SIS design methods should incorporate security features that resist the 
impact of threats on system objects. 
3.1 SIS design methods must explicitly and thoroughly explore and account 
for the customer’s unique security requirements and needs. 
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3.2 SIS design methods should provide modeling support at the three levels 
of ISD (organizational, conceptual and technical) for abstract representation 
and operations for specifying the three essential elements of secure 
systems: threats, objects, and security features (safeguards or controls).. 
3.3 Any SIS design method must provide for its integration into ISD methods. 
3.4 SIS design methods should be adaptable to the ISD methods selected 
by developers according to their own judgment and preferences. 
3.5 SIS design methods should be adaptable to forthcoming ISD methods. 
4. Testable SIS 
design method 
hypotheses: (a) 
validity of the 
method meta-
requirements; 




4.0 (a) Successful SIS design methods will include a process to protect IS 
security objects from IS security threats through IS security features. 
4.1 (a) Successful SIS design methods include processes and notation for 
extensively acquiring and documenting security requirements. (b) It is 
feasible and practicable to start the SIS development with the customers’ 
requirements.  
4.2 (a) Successful SIS design methods offer modeling support at the three 
levels of ISD (organizational, conceptual and technical); (b) It is feasible and 
practicable to develop a SIS design method to offer modeling support for 
threats, objects and security features at the three levels of abstraction. 
4.3 (a) The more consistent and concordant the processes and notation of a 
SIS design method is with common ISD methods, the more successful the 
SIS design method will be in practice. (b) It is feasible and practicable to 
embed SIS design methods into ISD methods. 
4.4 (a) The more consistent and concordant with a wide variety of ISD 
methods the processes and notation of a SIS design method is, the more 
successful the SIS design method will be in organizations. (b) It is feasible 
and practicable for developers to adopt the SIS design methods without 
constraining their ability to adopt appropriate ISD methods.  
4.5 (a) The more the processes and notation of a SIS design method adapts 
to unpredicted new ISD methods, the more successful the SIS design 
method will be in organizations. (b) It is feasible and practicable for 
developers to adopt the SIS design methods to innovative new ISD methods.
 
SIS Design Theory: Meta-Requirements 
 
We will discuss these six meta-requirements (MR) below, and relate them to the kernel 
theories, meta-design principles and the two major sets of hypotheses. Our aim is not to 
present the exhaustive set of MRs for SIS design methods, but rather to first outline 
some essential MRs for SIS and to demonstrate the applicability of design theory in 
SIS. TPF4FPT 
 
MR 0: SIS design methods must develop security features that resist the impact of 
threats on system objects. 
This essential MR provides the distinctive goal that distinguishes the SIS design 
methods from other systems development methods with which the SIS design methods 
must interoperate. SIS design methods must provide mechanisms to identify security 
                                                 
TP
4
PT These six meta-requirements were gleaned from the literature because they operate across most SIS 
design methods. For example, another meta-requirement is support for user participation. However, very 
few security methods are explicitly participative. Many of these more narrowly focused requirements can 
be subsumed under MR 3 in the model “A SIS design method should support its integration into normal 
ISD methods.” 
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safeguards, which are IS security features that protect IS security objects from threats in 
various ways (Baskerville, 1989). In a certain sense, this is the “identity” meta-
requirement that makes the outcome of the design a SIS design method as opposed to 
any other form of ISD method.  
Kernel Theory: Clements’ theory (described in the previous section). 
Meta-Design Principle: SIS design methods should incorporate security features that 
resist the impact of threats on system objects.  
Hypotheses: (a) Successful SIS design methods include a process to protect IS 
security objects from IS security threats through IS security features.  
 
MR 1: Development of SIS originates in a customer’s security requirements.  
A customer’s security requirements must be the point of departure when developing SIS. 
Organizations must ensure that valuable assets (objects) are correctly protected from 
possible security threats through the introduction of IS security features. Since 
organizations’ assets, business objectives, and operating environments differ, their IS 
security requirements, ultimately, differ (Baskerville, 1993). Certainly external factors, 
such as legislation, will have impacts on the development of SIS; however, the customer 
ultimately decides to what extent any external factors will matter in the development. (In 
an opposing situation, the customer has little or no power to decide the SIS 
requirement.)  
Kernel Theory: Hume’s thesis of “no ought from (an) is” (Hume’s law) means it is 
illogical to infer “ought” (what an organization should do in terms of security) from “is” 
(what it is possible to do in terms of what security solutions exist or what others have 
done to secure their systems). Using Hume’s terms, “is”-matters include facts and 
observations, such as certain security solutions known to have worked.  Such 
knowledge is based on available evidence and situated in a certain environment, and 
may be useful in the development of SIS. However, such facts (or “is”-matters) cannot 
logically drive the design. Consequently, we should start the design with the 
organizational security requirements.  
Meta-Design Principle: SIS design methods must provide explicit and thorough support 
for capturing and accounting for the customer’s unique security requirements and needs: 
“What are the valuable assets in an organization that must be protected from IS security 
threats by introduction of suitable security features?” 
Hypotheses: (a) Successful SIS design methods include processes and notation for 
extensively acquiring and documenting SIS requirements. (b) It is feasible and 
practicable to start the SIS development with the customers’ requirements. In particular, 
SIS design methods shortcut the requirements processes and lead the designer to 
blindly implement certain predefined and generic security requirements. 
 
MR 2: SIS design methods should provide abstract representation and operations 
for specifying the three essential elements of secure systems - threats, objects, 
and security features (safeguards or controls) - for the three levels of abstraction: 
organizational, conceptual, and technical. 
SIS design methods should offer modeling support to model at least threats, objects, 
and security features for the three levels of IS. SIS design methods should not only 
provide aid on certain development stages or aspects, but also offer modeling support to 
model at least threats, objects, and security features at the three stages of ISD and SIS 
development. While an ideal ISD or SIS design method should offer support for all three 
domains, it does not mean that every ISD project will regard all three (e.g., developers 
may skip one phase in one ISD project and another phase in another ISD project). MR 2 
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means that SIS design methods must provide support for these three stages, but not 
necessarily prescribe that developers need to follow every phase in every project. TPF5FPT  
Kernel Theory: Aside from the basic practical need for designing in the abstract, this 
meta-requirement stems from research into IS metamodeling, which shows that IS can 
be divided into three levels of abstraction: organizational, conceptual, and technical 
(Iivari, 1989). 
Meta-Design Principle: SIS design methods should provide modeling support at the 
three levels of ISD (organizational, conceptual, and technical) for abstract representation 
and operations to specify the three essential elements of secure systems:  threats, 
objects, and security features (safeguards or controls).  
Hypotheses: (a) Successful SIS design methods offer modeling support at the three 
levels of ISD (organizational, conceptual and technical); (b) It is feasible and practicable 
to develop a SIS design method to offer modeling support for threats, objects, and 
security features at the three levels of abstraction.  
 
MR3: SIS design methods must be able to integrate to ISD. 
Typically, SIS development and normal ISD have been separate streams of 
development activities (Baskerville, 1992). However, in order to build security into new 
systems, SIS design methods cannot operate independently of ISD methods. A SIS 
design method should support its integration to ISD methods. 
Kernel Theory: MR 3 arises from the theory of developmental duality, Ockham’s razor, 
and the thesis of ontological dependencies. Developmental duality holds that the 
separation of normal system development from SIS development inevitably leads to 
conflicting goals and functional requirements (White and Dhillon, 2005). Separate SIS 
design methods (i.e., those that cannot be integrated into normal IS development) 
should be avoided if both system security and system functionality are to be effective 
(Baskerville, 1992). The problem of developmental duality can be traced back to 
Ockham’s razor, “Plurality should not be assumed without necessity” (Ockham, 1990 p. 
93). Moreover, Niiniluoto’s (1999) thesis of ontological dependency makes the 
integration of SIS and IS development a pragmatic necessity: If there were no IS, there 
would be no pragmatic need for IS security. But developers can create an IS without 
security. IS is an artifact (a human construct), and its security is ontologically dependent 
on ISD for its existence.  
Meta-Design Principle: Any SIS design method must provide for its integration into ISD 
methods.  
Hypotheses: (a) The more consistent and concordant the processes and notation of a 
SIS design method are with common ISD methods, the more successful the SIS design 
method will be in practice. (b) It is feasible and practicable to embed SIS design 
methods into ISD methods. SIS design methods should not promote a deferral of 
security considerations for treatment by separate SIS development phases after the IS 
has been created. 
 
MR 4: SIS design methods should enable the autonomy of developers. 
According to their situation, developers frequently select from a "toolkit" of methods or 
method fragments (Kumar and Welke, 1992; Slooten, 1996). For example, according to 
their judgment of the problem settings, they might choose Spiral Modeling (Boehm, 
1988) and Unified Modeling Language (Rumbaugh et al., 1999) for one project and 
                                                 
TP
5
PT In fact, MR 4 suggests that the developers should be able to freely to select those techniques, tools and 
processes of ISD that they prefer to use in an ISD project. 
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Extreme Programming (Beck, 1999) for the next. Developers should be able to address 
SIS concerns with their preferred ISD methods, and SIS design methods should respect 
developers’ autonomyTPF6FPT by enabling them to select the ISD methods they judge to be 
correct for the setting. This autonomy extends to organizations that may wish to 
standardize their in-house methods (including security). Failing MR 4 means requiring 
developers to switch their traditional ISD methods or forcing them to learn and use 
separate SIS design methods in addition to their normal methods. SIS design methods 
meeting MR 4 become more accessible and less costly for organizations. TPF7FPT 
Kernel Theory: MR 4 originates from the need to give proper respect to the autonomy 
of humans, as recognized by Kant’s rule of human dignity, and by Rawls’ principle of 
liberty (“liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty,” Kukathas and Pettit, 1990 p. 
50). This autonomy has the practical effect of improving the feasibility of SIS design for 
more organizations, giving this MR both ethical and practical value.  
Meta-Design Principle: SIS design methods should be adaptable to those ISD methods 
that developers have selected according to their own judgments and preferences.  
Hypotheses: (a) The more that the processes and notation of a SIS design method are 
consistent and concordant with a wide variety of ISD methods, the more the SIS design 
method will be successful in organizations. (b) It is feasible and practicable for 
developers to adopt the SIS design methods without constraining their ability to adopt 
appropriate ISD methods. More specifically, SIS design methods meeting MR 4 would 
make security methods available and feasible for more companies compared to SIS 
design methods that do not meet MR 4. 
 
MR 5: SIS design methods should be adaptable to forthcoming ISD methods. 
MR 5 proceeds to a degree from MR 4. If a SIS design method does not take into 
account the autonomy of developers, i.e., is not adaptable to the existing ISD methods, 
then the SIS design method is unlikely to be adaptable to forthcoming ISD methods.  
Kernel Theory: The kernel theory behind MR 5 is emergence theory, according to which 
ISD methods are known to be emergent (Truex et al., 1999). Not only do new methods 
spring up every now and then (Jayaratna, 1994), but in practice, methods are hardly 
executed exactly the same way twice (Truex et al., 2000). It is difficult to predict this 
emergence or to allow for a predefined universal SIS design method that will match 
every ISD method and its permutations. Emergence is exemplified in agile or short-
                                                 
TP
6
PT In philosophical literature, autonomy has an individualistic viewpoint. It means that people can decide 
freely and rationally, free from any coercion or manipulation, what to do, or what ISD method to use. Here 
we use the term in its plural form ‘autonomy of developers’ in a more collective sense, and by this we 
recognize that the ISD method used in organizations is hardly autonomously (in the sense autonomy is 
understood in philosophy) selected by individual developers. Rather the selection may be determined by 
quality managers, partner organizations, other developers, by superiors in general, or by decisions at a team 
level or division level, etc.  
TP
7
PT One may argue that by appealing to autonomy, developers can ignore security issues in practice. This is a 
risk that comes with autonomy: autonomy increases individual freedom with the result that more 
responsibility is put on the shoulders of the individual (Hare, 1963). This “risk” encompasses any SIS 
method in two ways. First, as in this paper, SIS methods can be viewed as tools (roughly speaking). This 
means that developers of such tools try to ensure that the tools have certain features (the meta-requirements 
in our case) without regulating the use of that tool in practice in too much detail. And second, even if 
developers of the tools (SIS methods) regulate the use of the tool in great detail, nothing would stop the 
practitioners from ignoring these regulations in practice. 
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cycle-time methods that sometimes change and adapt from project to project 
(Baskerville and Pries-Heje, 2004).  SIS design methods currently emerge long after 
their related ISD methods (Baskerville, 1993). MR 5 operates with an ideal goal of 
integrating security quickly and effectively into each (existing, forthcoming and 
unpredicted) version of an ISD method.  
Meta-Design Principle: Successful SIS design methods should be adaptable to 
forthcoming ISD methods.  
Hypotheses. (a) The more the processes and notation of a SIS design method adapt to 
unpredicted new ISD methods, the more successful the SIS design method will be in 
organizations; (b) It is feasible and practicable for developers to adopt the SIS design 
methods to innovative new ISD methods.  
 
Analysis of existing SIS Design Methods  
 
Based on our earlier review of SIS design methods (Baskerville, 1993; Siponen, 2005a, 
2005b), we compiled the SIS design methods into a taxonomy and constructed a meta-
requirements analysis of these existing SIS design methods as summarized in Table 2. 
MR 0 is not represented in the table or discussed below because it is definitional, in the 
sense that all SIS methods must address this meta-requirement. That is, they must 
contain a process, according to which security features are installed aimed at ensuring 
that threats do not get at security objects. Methods that fail to meet MR 0 would not 
qualify for discussion below. Beyond this, the table indicates the extent to which current 
SIS design methods meet the other five meta-requirements specified by the design 
theory above.  
 
Table 2. The different SIS design methods. The sign – means that SIS design 
methods do not meet the particular meta-requirement, while + indicates that SIS 
design methods do meet the particular meta-requirement. 
 












SIS Checklists: List the ideal 
and generic protection means 
that organizations should 
implement 
Wood et al. (1987) - - - - - 
SIS Standards: Prescribes 
authoritative and generic SIS 
solutions for all organizations 
BS 7799 (1993); GASSP 
(1999); ITSEC (1990); OECD 
(1996), ISF (2005); ISO/IEC 
17799 (2005) 
- - - - - 
Integrative methods 
Information / Database 
Modeling Methods: Modeling 
notations for expressing 
security constraints based on 
structured and object-oriented 
paradigms 
Smith (1989); Ellmer et al. 
(1995); Pernul et al. (1998) + - - - - 
Responsibility Methods: 
Identification of workers’ role 
responsibilities is key for 
designing security in 
Backhouse and Dhillon (1996); 
Dhillon (1997); McDermott and 
Fox (1999);Sindre and Opdahl 
(2000) 
+ - + - - 
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organizations 
Business Process Security 
Methods: Add security 
constraints in the business 
processes 
Herrmann and Pernul (1999); 
Röhm et al. (1998); Röhm and 
Pernul (1998); Röhm et al. 
(1999) 
+ + - - - 
The Security-Modified ISD 
methods: These security 
methods are influenced by 
different IS development 
methods 
Baskerville (1988; 1989); 
Booysen and Eloff (1995); 
Hitchings (1995); James 








+ - - 
 
Limitations of Mainstream SIS Methods 
 
The mainstream methods are SIS checklists and SIS standards (Table 2).  
MR 1: SIS checklists and standardsTPF8FPT (e.g., ISO/IEC17799, 2005) attempt to capture the 
available SIS solutions and best SIS practices in checklists and standards (Baskerville, 
1993; Siponen, 2001). The idea here is to promote authoritative and generic checklists 
and standards that prescribe generic SIS requirements for all organizations (Siponen, 
2005b). For example, ISO/IEC17799 (2005) proposes generic SIS principles that 
“…apply to most organizations and in most environments” (BS ISO/IEC17799, 2005) In 
the case of checklists and standards, the needs of organizations are replaced by ideal 
protection requirements and techniques. Organizations are often driven to follow these 
with little rationale. Consequently, for both SIS checklists and standards, this means that 
the unique needs and problems of organizations are overlooked (e.g., Baskerville, 1988; 
1993). Hence, Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) fail, and Principle 1 is not addressed: 
Checklists and information security management standards do not meet MR 1.  
 
MR 2: While SIS checklists and standards offer different principles for SIS, they do not 
provide any modeling support (or means for conceptual modeling). Therefore, these SIS 
methods do not offer modeling support to the extent that satisfies both Hypotheses 2(a) 
and 2(b). As a consequence, Principle 2 is not addressed and MR 2 is not met.  
 
MR 3, 4 and 5: All mainstream methods (SIS checklists and information security 
management standards) are targeted for securing a completed IS. The mainstream 
methods are stand-alone, separate methods, and operate, by definition, independently 
of ISD methods. Baskerville (1993) and Siponen (2005b) point out that not only do these 
SIS methods offer no guidance as to how IS developers can integrate them into ISD, but 
also the methods are intended to be applied to already existing or completed systems. 
Consequently, Hypotheses 3(a), 4(a), and 5(a) cannot succeed, and Principles 3, 4, and 
5 are not addressed. The three meta-requirements are unmet. This means that these 
SIS design methods are more suitable for securing existing, unsecured, and static 
systems; and that they are not suitable for use for building new secure systems, or 
emergent secure systems (Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). To 
summarize, none of the mainstream methods meet any of these five meta-requirements. 
 
                                                 
TP
8
PT One might argue that standards like ISO/IEC17799 are management standards. However, in practice, 
standards may drive SIS design, as organizations have a need to ensure that their IS meet the criteria 
presented by standards. Therefore, they are included in the analysis. 
A Design Theory for Secure IS Design Methods/Siponen et al. 
 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 11, pp. 725-770/November 2006 
 
736
Limitations of Integrative SIS Methods  
 
To avoid the shortcomings of the mainstream methods, integrative SIS design methods 
have been developed that coordinate, SIS design more closely with the social 
organization, the essential ISD, or the organizational (business) goals. In Table 2, these 
methods are classified in terms of different method families (Siponen, 2005a): 
information modeling, responsibility modeling, business process modeling, and security-
modified ISD methods.  
 
MR 0: As mentioned above, all SIS methods meet this requirement as the identity 
requirement that qualifies them as SIS methods. 
 
MR 1: Siponen (2005a) concludes that these integrative SIS design methods (the 
security-modified IS development, responsibility modeling, information modeling, and 
business process methods) take into consideration the fact that organizations may have 
unique SIS requirements, and accordingly, propose different techniques to discover 
these requirements. The security-modified ISD methods use requirements analysis, 
influenced by ISD methods, to capture the organizations’ SIS requirements. 
Responsibility methods model responsibilities in organizations, from which organization-
specific SIS requirements are derived. Therefore, both the security-modified ISD and 
responsibility methods address MR 1. Similarly, information modeling methods offer 
modeling notations for expressing SIS constraints, based on the organization’s unique 
SIS requirements, and hence meet MR 1. Also, business process methods address MR 
1 by providing tools to model organization-specific SIS constraints in relation to business 
processes.  
Hence, all of these integrative SIS design methods satisfy Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b), 
address Principle 1, and meet the MR 1.  
 
MR 2: Within the security-modified ISD methods, the Logical Control method 
(Baskerville, 1988) adds SIS controls to Data Flow Diagrams. Similarly, the SIS Spiral 
(Booysen and Eloff, 1995) addresses access control issues in data flows. Both the 
Logical Control and the SIS Spiral methods provide conceptual level modeling support. 
The Virtual Methodology (Hitchings, 1995) provides a notation at the organizational level 
to model authorized and unauthorized relations. The risk analysis process of SIS 
planning methodology (Straub and Welke, 1998) is at the organizational level (Siponen, 
2001).  
 
The information modeling methods offer notations to extend Entity-Relationship (ER) 
and data flow diagrams to cover SIS requirements or constraints. Thus, the information 
modeling methods provide organizational- and conceptual-level modeling support. The 
business process paradigm offers modeling support at all levels of abstraction, from SIS 
requirements capture to implementation and coding issues.  
 
The responsibility modeling methods, including the responsibility method proposed by 
Strens and Dobson (1993), the semantic responsibility method (Backhouse and Dhillon, 
1996), the task-based authorization method (Thomas and Sandhu, 1994), the abuse 
case (McDermott and Fox, 1999) and misuse cases (Sindre and Opdahl, 2000), provide 
conceptual-level modeling support. The exception is MAPS (Pottas and von Solms, 
1995), which provides modeling support at all three levels of abstraction. Of the 
integrative SIS design methods, only MAPS and the business process methods provide 
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modeling support that satisfies the dictate of Hypothes 2(a). Therefore other SIS design 
methods fail to address Principle 2 and do not meet MR 2. 
 
In the case of the business process security methods (Herrmann and Pernul, 1999; 
Röhm et al., 1998; Röhm and Pernul, 1999) and the SIS design method by Pottas and 
von Solms (1995) (which offers modeling support at the three levels of ISD), Hypotheses 
2(a) and 2(b) are satisfied.  They also address Principle 2 and satisfy MR 2.  
 
MR 3: Of the integrative SIS design methods, the Logical Control method (Baskerville, 
1988, 1989) can be integrated into structured ISD methods, data flow, and ER diagrams. 
The SIS Spiral method (Booysen and Eloff, 1995) can be integrated into methods that 
utilize Boehm’s spiral model. The abuse (McDermott and Fox, 1999) and misuse (Sindre 
and Opdahl, 2000) case methods can be integrated into use case notations in the 
requirements analysis phase. These SIS design methods satisfy Hypotheses 3(a) and 
3(b), addressing Principle 3 and satisfying MR 3.  
While the information modeling methods do not address their integration into ISD, the 
security constraints modeling method (Pernul, 1992) might be integrated to structured 
methods (Data flow and ER diagrams), and object-oriented security semantics (Ellmer et 
al., 1995) might be integrated into object-oriented ISD methods.TPF9FPT The other integrative 
SIS design methods are difficult to embed into existing ISD methods and offer no 
guidance as to how they might be integrated into ISD (Baskerville, 1992; Siponen, 
2005a,b). Additionally, the fact that their notations differ from ISD methods is another 
obstacle to the integration of these SIS design methods into the ISD methods. Thus, the 
other integrative methods fail Hypotheses 3(a) or 3(b), do not address Principle 3, and 
fail to satisfy MR 3.   
 
MR 4: Although, the logical control method (Baskerville, 1988, 1989), the spiral method 
(Booysen and Eloff, 1995), and the abuse case (McDermott and Fox, 1999) and misuse 
case (Sindre and Opdahl, 2000) methods satisfy MR 3, these three SIS design methods 
are focused on a single ISD method (UML) or a narrow range of ISD methods. For 
example, the logical control method (Baskerville, 1988) discusses its integration into 
structured methods and data flow diagrams in particular, but not into other ISD methods. 
Similarly, the spiral method (Booysen and Eloff, 1995) concerns its integration into 
Boehm’s spiral, and the abuse and misuse case methods concentrate on use cases. As 
a result, none of the SIS design methods satisfy Hypothesis 4(a), and consequently, 
Hypothesis 4(b) also fails. 
 
All of these SIS design methods restrict the autonomy of developers in selecting the ISD 
methods according to their judgment.  None of the methods addresses Principle 4 or 
satisfies MR 4. Such restriction on the integration of these SIS design methods into ISD 
methods can be explained by the fact that these methods were explicitly designed as a 
part of certain ISD methods, such as Boehms’ spiral, or their specific notation, such as 
DFDs and use cases. They were not designed to be generic SIS components that can 
be integrated into different sorts of ISD methods.  
 
MR 5: Since the existing SIS design methods constrain the autonomy of developers 
(failing MR 4), it is unlikely that Hypothes 5(b) will ever succeed for these SIS design 
                                                 
TP
9
PT Such integration may be possible, since these methods are based on Data Flow and ER diagrams, and 
object-modeling. 
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methods (or at least without modifications to the SIS design methods). Principle 5 is lost, 
and MR 5 remains unsatisfied. 
 
Summary. In light of the meta-requirements of the SIS design theory, none of the 
current SIS design methods address MR 4 and MR 5, only four of the existing SIS 
design methods meet MR 3, and in addition to business process methods, only MAPS 
(Pottas and von Solms, 1995) from among the security-modified IS development 
methods meets MR 2. To overcome these limitations, we developed the following 
solution to address these meta-requirements. 
 
Proving a SIS Design Theory That Addresses the Six Meta-requirements 
 
Research into design theory has frequently been limited to the abstract theoretical realm, 
as has the work above so far. In these cases, the application or “proof” that the design 
theory operates empirically is deferred to future research (e.g., Walls et al., 1992; 
Kasper, 1996). Our research goals were primarily focused on the establishment of a 
major advance in SIS design methodology that proved usable in the field.  An empirical 
field study of design theory entails (1) the development of a SIS method, in our case 
called Meta-notation, which reflects the design theory, and (2) the application of the 
resulting methodology in practice.  While such studies will not demonstrate universal 
validity for this design theory, the studies will demonstrate that the theory operates in 
known settings. 
 
The first part of the field study utilizes conceptual-analytical and constructive research to 
develop a Meta-notation attuned to the SIS design theory. The SIS design problem, in 
light of the meta-requirements, is abstracted by following the ideas of method 
engineering (Tolvanen, 1998) and metamodeling (Gigch, 1991). From the perspective of 
Meta-notation, we infer from the academic literature a general model of SIS design 
method notation comprising six essential elements. The second part of the field study 
uses clinical fieldwork methods (Schein, 1987) and action research. Figure 4 illustrates 
the two-stage fieldwork for “proving” the design theory in use. 
 
 
Figure 4. The development of a SIS design method, namely Meta-notation, 
to address the six SIS meta-requirements. The figure describes the theory 
development and clinical field work phases. It also shows the kernel 
theories in the sense of Walls et al. (1992) used to develop the Meta-
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notation. The kernel theories include ISD metamodeling and modeling in 




The Development Of A SIS Method: Meta-Notation 
 
A comprehensive ISD method includes a process system (guiding how the development 
is carried out) and a notation system (Hirschheim and Klein, 1992). The three higher-
order meta-requirements (MR 3, 4, and 5) indicate a meta-method solution. In order for a 
design method to be integrated into existing (as required by MR 3) or future (as required 
by MR 5) ISD methods, SIS design theory demands a higher level of abstraction than 
existing SIS design methods. Meta-notation involves schemes for the creation and 
assembly of methods and method fragments. These schemes are of particular interest to 
method engineering and metamodeling (e.g., Alderson et al., 1998; Brinkkemper et al., 
1996; Brinkkemper et al., 1999; Gigch, 1991; Hillegersberg and Kumar, 1999; Nuseibeh 
et al., 1996; Slooten, 1996; Tolvanen, 1998). Meta-method tools, such as MetaEdit+, 
provide the means for rapidly developing computer-aided systems analysis and software 
engineering (CASA/CASE) tools to match development needs and settings (Marttiin et 
al., 1996). 
 
Regularities in ISD and SIS  
 
Moving to a meta-method level of abstraction yields a perspective of ISD methods that 
reveals how these are in a constant state of emergence and change. Since ISD settings 
may be different, ISD methods are often modified to suit different contexts (Mathiassen 
and Purao, 2002; Truex et al., 2000). However, systems problem settings and 
development approaches are not in total chaos and relativism. That is, different 
development situations are not totally disparate. Otherwise, our practical experience with 
past ISD would have no value for future ISD tasks. Experience helps us recognize 
regularities in the way problem settings arise and methods emerge. In order to satisfy 
the three higher-order meta-requirements of our design theory, our meta-method must 
discern a sufficient range of these regularities in order to be useful.  
 
We used an analytical process for discovering regularities in SIS design elements.  This 
process is described in detail below (Figure 2). First, we looked across ISD and SIS 
design methods in order to find common core concepts (subjects and objects). Second, 
we surfaced the regularities in existing SIS design methods (e.g., Baskerville, 1993; 
Siponen, 2005a, b) resulting in four additional concepts (security constraints, security 
classifications, abuse subjects and abuse scenarios, and security policy). Finally, we 
consulted a panel of practitioners for comments about the patterns. This process led to a 
notation with six elements. While some computer security researchers, particularly 
cryptographers, distinguish other security elements (e.g., Menezes et al., 1999), the six 
described below proved sufficient for our purposes to capture most of the common 
regularities found in SIS development. Additional elements can certainly be added to the 
Meta-notation on an ad-hoc basis as required.  
 
Subjects, Objects, and Classification 
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In seeking regularities in ISD methods, notation systems quickly rise in their apparent 
regularity across many methods and problem settings. More than a thousand different 
ISD methods are reported to exist (Jayaratna, 1994) with many differences, for example 
in terms of sociological paradigms (Hirschheim and Klein, 1989), and ontological 
expressiveness (Wand and Weber, 1993). Yet there are commonalities among these 
ISD methods, of which two are relevant for our purposes. One objective common to ISD 
methods is to help developers to understand and model reality with respect to the 
system-to-be-built (Hirschheim et al., 1995; Iivari, 1989; Lyytinen, 1987). In order to do 
such analysis and modeling, developers need to agree on how to describe things in 
different levels of abstraction (organizational, conceptual and technical, see Iivari, 1989). 
Traditionally, things are classified as ‘entities’ (e.g., structured methods) or ‘objects’ 
(e.g., object-oriented methods) in the ISD literature (Wand et al., 1999). Additionally, 
some ISD methods use ‘actors’ (e.g., the UML type of use case diagram) or ‘stick 
figures’ (e.g., Checkland’s rich picture) at the organizational level (e.g., requirements 
analysis stage).  
 
Any SIS design method that aims to integrate itself with ISD methods needs to address 
how the security aspects can be described in term of entities common to ISD methods, 
such as actors. This may happen, for example, by mapping the SIS design method 
notation schema to these ISD entities. Thus, given that there exist certain common 
things in ISD methods (e.g., objects in object-oriented methods, or entities in structured 
methods), and that we can map SIS notation to these entities, we are able to address 
the six SIS meta-requirements.   
 
One simple solution addresses this issue. In Meta-notation, the ‘actors’, ‘entities’, or 
‘objects’ are classified as security subjects and objects. This is consistent with Clements’ 
theory that establishes the identity of SIS methods. As a result, notational dimensions for 
security subjects and objects can, in principle, be added into any of the many notational 
patterns that use actors, entities, or objects as units of analysis. For example, both the 
structured and object-oriented ISD methods (Lyytinen, 1987) are good candidates for the 
addition of such security notation. Security subjects denote the different security-relevant 
entities, i.e., entities that have a relevant security connection to the assets of the 
organization (security objects). Security subjects may include automated processes, 
network nodes, employees of the organization, business partners, and third parties. 
Security subjects include (where they have a security-relevant connection to the assets 
of the organizations) actors in use cases and stick figures in rich pictures.  
 
The term ‘security objects’ refers to the assets of the organization that are of relevance 
in terms of information security. Such assets (security objects) may range from physical 
things such as paper to electronic entities such as files. The terms ‘security subjects’ and 
‘objects’ are used in database security literature to describe computer access control 
policies and models (e.g., Castano et al., 1995; McLean, 1990; Sandhu, 1993). These 
access control policies and models from the field of database security in turn influence 
computer security classification schemes. Security classification stems from the need to 
classify security objects and subjects according to their information security sensitivity. 
 
The abuse subject is a special class of security subjects referring to those that may carry 
out a security violation. The introduction of abuse subjects and abuse scenarios, 
influenced by McDermott and Fox (1999), may be needed for two kinds of situations. 
First, they may come in handy when there is a need to explore and identify potential 
threat scenarios. Second, they are relevant for testing purposes. They help to check that 
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the IS and software under design can cope with unwanted scenarios or attacks by 
unauthorized people or processes through security features. 
 
Security Constraints  
 
Security constraints are the rules being enforced in relation to security objects. These 
may include write access, read access, etc. We can discover security constraints by 
analyzing the security requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-
repudiation) for each security object. The theoretical background of the constraints 
concept stems from “security requirements.” In the security literature, there is wide 
agreement on four security requirements (e.g., Parker, 1981, 1998): confidentiality or 
non-disclosure (prevent/detect improper disclosure of information), integrity (information 
should not be modified by unauthorized personnel), availability (information should only 
be available to authorized personnel), and “non-repudiation” (Chokhani, 1994; Röhm et 
al., 1998). Non-repudiation is important for enabling financial transactions and data 
interchange, which are keys to electronic commerce. It is needed to make valid large-
scale contracts between vendors and customers. Non-repudiation means that a 
contracting party cannot subsequently deny its actions. These constraints can be 
derived from customers or from their information security policy.  
In summary, the Meta-notation includes six dimensions: 1) security subjects, 2) security 
objects, 3) security constraints, 4) security classifications, 5) abuse subjects and abuse 
scenarios, and 6) security policy. These dimensions are optional depending on the exact 
security setting.  
 
A Meta-notation Illustration 
 
To clarify the operation of this Meta-notation, we illustrate how it can be applied using a 
simple demonstration of a use case notation and a class diagram common in object-
oriented ISD methods. We chose use cases for demonstrating the Meta-notation 
because most object-oriented methods employ use cases in the requirements analysis 
phase to collect and analyze requirements. Use case notation demonstrates what a user 
should be able to do with the system; use cases are graphical or textual presentations of 
the usage of a system (Jacobson et al., 1992). 
Figure 5 is a traditional textual use case description. The use case is ‘booking’.  
Use case: Booking.  
Version: 1.0 
Functional Summary: A booking clerk books journeys for customers.  
Frequency: several times a day 
Usability requirements: Any database query and booking must be able to complete in less than 30 
seconds. 
Actor: a clerk.   
Preconditions: Booking and customer databases exist.  
Exceptions: If information on certain journey is not available an appropriate error message is 
produced. 
Figure 5. A traditional use case (adapted from Jaaksi, 1998). 
 
Now presume that there is a need to address security considerations in ISD. Figure 4 
describes the use case presented in Figure 3 enriched by five security dimensions of the 
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Meta-notation. The normal use case semantics are presented in italics, while the 
security semantics are illustrated in italics and boldface. The example demonstrates an 
implementation of a security policy that states booking clerks can only access objects 
labeled as confidential within the booking department. The security policy constraints are 
expressed in the Meta-notation enriched use case in Figure 6 as the Security 
policy/Specific security restrictions. 
 
Use case: Booking. 
Version: 1.0 
Functional Summary: A booking clerk books journeys for customers.  
Frequency: Several times a day 
Usability requirements: Any database query and booking must be able to complete in less than 30 
seconds. 
Actor/security subject: A clerk. 
Security classification of the subject: confidential 
Security objects and access types to security objects: Object: customer file (the clerk must be 
able to read, update and delete the customer information); Object: booking database (the clerk must 
be able to read, update and delete the customer information on the database) 
Security policy/Specific security restrictions: The clerk is only allowed to access security objects 
classified as confidential with the booking department.    
Preconditions: Booking and customer databases exist. The identity of the booking clerk/security 
subject has been validated.   
Exceptions: If information on a certain journey is not available, an appropriate error message is 
produced. 
Figure 6. A Meta-notation enriched use case. 
 
The security subject in Figure 6 is the booking clerk. The clerk’s security classification 
clearance is confidential (classification of security subjects). The relevant security 
objects with respect to this use case are the customer file and the booking database. 
The types of access to these objects are create, read, delete, and update.  
 
Continuing this example, we can illustrate how abuse cases are connected to respective 
use cases. Abuse cases, like the other five security elements, are included only as 
deemed relevant by the designers. Figure 7 describes an abuse case associated with 
the booking use case, including possible abuse scenarios, assumed frequency of the 
action, presumed abuse subject, and the security object that is the target of that abuse. TPF10FPT 
There are also total costs of recovering from the abuse ($ 1500). The cost information, 










                                                 
TP
10
PT Abuse subjects are not applied to normal use cases, as they do not concern normal use, but unauthorized 
use. 
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Abuse case: Booking. 
Version: 1.0 
Possible abuse scenario: A malicious user carries out a denial-of-service attack halting (use 
case) booking, i.e., halting a clerk in booking journeys for customers.  
Frequency: Several times a day 
Abuse subject: A malicious user      
Security objects/target of abuse: Customer file, booking database. 
Total costs of recovering: $ 1500   
Figure 7 presents an abuse case scenario (cf., McDermott and Fox, 1999).  
 
Figure 8 shows the security level of each class. The security levels of classes are added 
into the class diagram. The user in Figure 8 is a security subject, while document is a 


















While the conceptual analysis and constructive research used to develop the design 
theory and Meta-notation provide a degree of logical rigor, fieldwork is needed for an 
empirical validation of the concepts. The most effective means for empirically validating 
ISD or SIS design methods entails action research, in other words, researchers must “go 
into the world and try them out” (Wood-Harper, 1989). Proper evaluation of a design 
theory requires that we apply the resulting artifacts in their intended settings, providing 
empirical evidence that the prescribed means are a promising route to the desired ends.  
Therefore, we designed action research to apply the design theory and its proposed 
Meta-notation in actual practice, and to evaluate the results.  
 
Action research is an interventionist and interpretive method (Klein and Myers, 1999; 
Walsham, 1996). From the perspective of action research, theories are validated through 
successful use in solving practical problems; successful use being defined through the 
social reflection of the collaborators in the research. Action research has also been 
demonstrated as a valuable research strategy for investigating ISD methods (Avison et 
al., 2001; Baskerville and Pries-Heje, 1999). In fact, it has been argued that action 
research is ideal for studying IS methods in a practical setting because it expands 
scientific knowledge while simultaneously putting theories to work in practice to help 
participating organizations solve concrete problems (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 
1998). 
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Action research is typically represented as an iterative process of theory-based 
diagnosis followed by practical interventions in the form of action planning, action taking, 
and evaluation in a field setting (Figure 9). Based on the specific learning that arises 
from evaluation, the theory is changed (if necessary) and the cycle repeats until a theory 











Figure 9. Action research iteration (adapted from Susman and Evered, 1978). 
 
Our research used staged action research methods involving two stages and three 
iteration cycles (Figure 10). Stage one was a preliminary study that followed a form of 
action research called “clinical fieldwork” (Schein, 1987). Clinical action research is 
distinguished by its precise focus on the organizational problem and expectations for a 
single pass (iteration 1) through the action research cycle. Based on the results of the 
preliminary study, we proceeded to an expanded action research setting (Stage 2) that 
involved two iterative cycles. The outer iteration 2 operated at the level of the software 
development organization, while the nested inner iteration 3 operated within a particular 
ISD project. All three action research iterations involved introducing the Meta-notation 
into the organization as a solution to poor security development methods. In each 
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Iteration 1 Iteration 2
Iteration 3
 
Figure 10. The stages of action research in this study. 
 
Appendix C summarizes the criteria for evaluating such action research designs and 
discusses how the features of this design satisfy these criteria. 
 
Preliminary Clinical Fieldwork 
 
Following the development of the Meta-notation from the design theory, we sought a 
software development organization with SIS development problems. Company A was 
involved in building a web-based database for films and movies that raised serious 
security concerns in protecting the intellectual property.  
 
Working with one of the software companies engaged by Company A, the researchers 
helped introduce the Meta-notation into the existing modeling notation. We recorded the 
experiences, opinions, and evaluations of the practitioners in interview sessions and 
reviewed design documents. The Meta-notation operated as predicted, and the modified 
methods were applied in designing and building the Company A software. In the opinion 
of the participants, the Meta-notation worked as expected via the design theory.  
 
Clinical researchers would advocate that this single loop is sufficient to validate the 
underlying theory in practice (iteration 1 in Figure 8, see Appendix A for further details on 
the preliminary clinical fieldwork). While the generality of the design theory will not 
necessarily be improved by additional action research, we can increase the confidence 
in the design theory by expanding the application to other settings. Accordingly, we 
proceeded to develop a full action research study to introduce the design theory and the 
Meta-notation into a more complex design setting. 
 
Proving Meta-Notation In Company B 
 
Company B is a large software house that develops customized systems and offers 
consulting services in all aspects of IS and software development. It uses an in-house 
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ISD method, sells this ISD method as a product, and provides related consultation 
services. The most important clients of the company include government agencies, 
insurance companies, banks, and industrial companies. 
 
A chief developer, responsible for security matters in ISD, contacted one of the authors. 
The chief developer believed that the company’s ISD method didn’t offer adequate 
support for the SIS aspects of ISD. As a result, this author worked with the chief 
developer to explore the possibility of an action research project that would integrate 
relevant security aspects into their ISD processes. This meeting led, in turn, to a meeting 
among the chief developer, the manager of the ISD department, and the development 
manager of the company. After reviewing the Meta-notation, the chief developer and the 
two managers sought to set up the action research project for the purpose of integrating 
the Meta-notation into company’s ISD method and subsequently move the result into 
practice. We present the implementation of the research phases (iteration 2 in Figure 10) 
and the schedule in Figure 11. 
 




Iteration 2 Research in Company B  
 
The action research team for iteration 2 consisted of two researchers, the chief 
developer, two managers, and several software developers. The T Tresearchers integrated 
Meta-notation into Company B’s ISD method, which was based on the Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) process and UML notation. We integrated the six security elements 
of the Meta-notation into the process documents through three integration iterations with 
close cooperation between researchers and practitioners. The practitioners on the team 
were consulted to ensure that the integration was successful in each phase. After the 
integration phase, the method was evaluated empirically. We describe these iterations 
and the empirical evaluation next. 
 
Diagnosis: identification of problems in the company’s existing ISD practice 
 
While Company B does not apply any particular SIS method, it does use its own 
proprietary information systems security checklist in ISD. The chief developer felt that, at 
present, the feasibility of adding security features into IS or a software product rests on 
the competence of individual developers and designers. In particular, he called for a 
systematic and holistic SIS method that would be integrated into all stages of the 
company’s existing ISD method: The chief developer asked,“How can information 
security features be handled in every stage of the ISD process, because [in a large 
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organization such as Company B] the developers in the different development phases 
are different persons?”  
 
The chief developer noted that misunderstandings between different developers (system 
analysts, designers, programmers and testers) are too frequent. He wanted a SIS design 
method that allows the developers to communicate with each other using the same 
concepts throughout the different phases of ISD. Such problems demanded a 
methodological solution in which SIS issues are integrated as a normal part of T Tthe ISD 
method. TPF11FPT Finally, he stressed that such a SIS design method should be as easy to use 
as possible.  
 
Both the chief developer and the managers felt that the company’s proprietary method (a 
variant of the RAD process) would be a good choice for this research project, since RAD 
teams are small. With small teams, the intervention would be easier to study and control. 
RAD projects are shorter than traditional projects, so the results are achieved more 
quickly. 
 
To obtain a deeper understanding of the problems of SIS in relation to the company’s 
ISD method, we interviewed four carefully selected practitioners: a method practitioner, a 
business manager, a software architect and the manager of the ISD department. 
Because Company B also sells its own ISD methods and related consultation services, 
these practitioners believed a Meta-notation enriched ISD method would be extremely 
relevant. The practitioners also pointed out three specific SIS problems in ISD: (1) the 
lack of a systematic approach to address SIS issues, (2) outdated and separate SIS 
instructions that were not part of the ISD methods and (3) wasted resources (security is 
added too late, costing money and resources, either directly or indirectly). The following 
comments illustrate these problems:  
 
“The method used lacks a systematic approach to security issues,” – software architect. 
“Security instructions have so far been incomplete…The instructions are too narrow,” – 
method practitioner.  
 
All the practitioners maintained that “security instructions have, up until now, been 
incomplete. We have had some instruction, but now [during the research project] the 
instructions are finally going to be developed further.” In addition, the business manager 
said that adding security afterward and separately from the ISD process leads to waste 
of resources, and, “In some projects, there is not enough knowledge of information 
security, so the responsibility for adding security rests on the auditors’ shoulders. 
Unfortunately, the auditors often lack the necessary information security skills.”  
The practical diagnosis in this setting aligned well with the drivers underlying the design 
theory, e.g., outdated SIS instructions, lack of SIS method resulting in waste of 
resources in ISD, etc. The loyal adherence to an in-house ISD method that lacked 
security considerations further aligned the setting to the design theory. We proceeded 
                                                 
TP
11
PT According to the chief developer, where there are different developers in different phases of ISD, either 
all developers need to have security expertise (otherwise it is likely that the SIS issues may be taken into 
account in one stage, but not in others), or the ISD method has to provide SIS features, leading to a 
situation in which the SIS issues are “naturally” taken into account in each phase of ISD. 
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with planning for the integration of the Meta-notation into the proprietary software ISD 
method of Company B.  
 
Action planning: planning the integration of the Meta-notation 
 
We scrutinized the company’s in-house ISD method and the RAD process to see how 
SIS Meta-notation could be integrated into the RAD process. The RAD process involves 
44 process documents including functionality specification, class description, 
architectural designs, test plan, and reports. These process documents are created by 
the ISD department of Company B, to inform Company B’s developers how to use the 
RAD process (documents are needed to ensure that all developers use consistent 
notations and concepts). For example, a class description document describes the 
methods and attributes of classes and explains how to make class diagrams.  
 
In planning, we realized that part of the Meta-notation dimensions could be easily 
integrated into these process documents. The RAD process documents included actors 
that can be characterized as security subjects. Also, the concept of the “information 
entities to be processed” in these process documents can be characterized as security 
objects, while information processing rules can be regarded as security constraints. 
Security classifications, security policy, abuse scenarios, and abuse cases proved more 
difficult to integrate into the process documents because there were no obvious 
equivalent structures in the methodology. Nevertheless, the in-house ISD method was 
expanded (or enriched) with these new security dimensions.  
 
After analyzing all 44 process documents, one of the authors made four Meta-notation 
enriched process documents by integrating the security dimensions of the Meta-notation 
to four requirement specification documents. The purpose of these documents was to 
demonstrate how the integration of the Meta-notation into the RAD process affects the 
original RAD process and how smoothly SIS aspects can be integrated into these 
documents.  
 
While the company was satisfied with the four process documents in general, they 
highlighted issues that needed critical attention during the integration process. The chief 
developer stressed that the whole ISD process must be covered. Moreover, the ISD 
department manager stressed that “It would be very useful to develop a document which 
can be used to demonstrate the security issues and risks to the clients’ managers.” In 
that way, the company’s clients would also obtain a general picture of the system’s risks 
and security requirements. 
 
The chief developer and the ISD department manager noted the promising nature of 
both the analytical and more casually expressed anticipation that the process of 
integrating the Meta-notation’s security dimensions into their in-house method would 
yield a solution. The team agreed to continue the research process by integrating SIS 
dimensions into the remaining process documents.  
 
Action taking: The integration of the Meta-notation into the RAD process  
The integration of the Meta-notation took place in a nested series of action research 
iterations (Iteration 3 in Figure 10). The action research team for this part of the research 
included one researcher, an architect, a subject matter expert in the application domain, 
and an engineer. This part of the research ran the inner action loop cycle through three 
iterations. The practitioners in Company B evaluated the results of the integrations after 
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each iteration. The process documents modified during the integration process are listed 
in Table 3.  We discuss the details of each of these iterations in more detail in Appendix 
B. 
 
Table 3. Meta-notation enriched documents by development stage.  
RAD process documents Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 
Requirement specification 4 documents 5 documents 6 documents 
Requirement analysis 2 documents 5 documents 5 documents 
Architectural verification 5 documents 5 documents 5 documents 
Design and implementation 3 documents 6 documents 6 documents 
Testing 2 documents 3 documents 3 documents 
New documents 0 documents 3 documents 0 documents 
Total 16 documents 24 documents 25 documents 
 
Development of the process model 
 
We present the Meta-notation enriched RAD process model that emerged from the 
action taking iterations, based on the original RAD process model in Figure 12. The 
Meta-notation enriched RAD project also takes clients’ SIS requirements as one of the 
points of departure for the ISD. The information security policy can set security 
constraints for data processing and define the classification policy used in the client 
organizations. Access control mechanisms and security constraints, in terms of the 
Meta-notation, can be inferred from the information security requirements. 
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Figure 12. The Meta-notation enriched RAD process model after integration of the 
Meta-notation.  
 
In the requirements analysis phase, the analyst defines use cases by using the security 
constraints and information security requirements from the requirements specification. 
After the use cases are created, the analyst defines abuse cases by basing these on 
abuse scenarios, the priority of the SIS requirements, and risk analysis.  
 
In the architectural verification stage, the architect designs the IS architecture by 
analyzing the architectural risks. By analyzing these architectural risks, and by 
considering the alternative architectural options, the architects and designers become 
aware of the risks of the particular application, and can decide how these risks should be 
addressed.  
 
In the design and implementation phase, the designer designs access control 
mechanisms and the developers implement these in order of requirements priority. The 
developers implement high-priority requirements before the medium priority 
requirements, and so on. Furthermore, countermeasures to abuse scenarios are 
designed and implemented in this phase. After the implementation, the access control 
mechanisms and countermeasures are tested.  
 
We integrated the Meta-notation dimensions in all phases of the RAD process to ensure 
that the SIS requirements would be implemented as planned. After the modifications, the 
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practitioners stated that the process documents and the Meta-notation enriched RAD 
method were ready to be tested in practice.  
 
Evaluation: Testing the Meta-notation enriched RAD process in practice. 
 
We empirically tested the Meta-notation enriched RAD method in a project aimed at 
developing an IS that the customers of Company B could use to update their purchased 
software products on-line. The project resources included three experienced software 
practitioners (a software architect, a technical expert and a software engineer). At the 
beginning of the project, the project team decided not to use the security classification 
element, because the implementation of such a system might be too heavy for a small 
application. As the software architect noted, “The security classifications may be difficult 
to implement as an access control mechanism. The implementation and design of such 
an access control mechanism may be too heavy to be done in one project.”  
 
Instead, the practitioners implemented access control was implemented by using 
security constraints. From a design theory viewpoint, this decision exercises the 
autonomy meta-requirement, and tests whether developers adapt SIS methods in an on-
the-fly, emergent manner. In this case, the classification element is excluded (indeed, it 
is supposed to be optional depending on the setting). 
 
The design team began by defining three abuse subjects and six abuse scenarios to 
demonstrate the harm the abusers might cause. From these scenarios, the team was 
able to recognize several security objects, such as user passwords and the update 
packages. After defining abuse scenarios, the team members separately prioritized the 
risks regarding each abuse scenario. After discussing these risks as a team, the team 
decided that three of these abuse scenarios had to be taken into account in the 
development of the IS.   
 
In the requirements analysis phase, the team defined the abuse cases relating to use of 
the system. In defining the abuse cases, they added color to the notation, using different 
colors in the use and abuse case diagram. They found color was effective for 
highlighting the SIS aspects of the IS. The team used red to highlight the abuser and 
related harmful actions and yellow to highlight the countermeasures that mitigated these 
harmful actions. White represented normal use cases (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. A use case diagram for the IS. The product team is an example of an 
insider threat and the intruder represents threat from outside.  Four elements are 
red in color:  “create a new update file,” “steal password,, “intruder,” and “Steal 
an update package.” Three elements are yellow in color: “Check the update 
package,” Change the password,” and “Check the last actions.” 
 
 
Specifying learning: Evaluation of the Meta-notation work in Company B 
We collected feedback from the experiences of the Meta-notation use in this setting 
through interviews with the practitioners (software architect, technical expert, and 
software engineer).  
 
Did the notation help acquire and document the security requirements (Hypothesis 
1(a))? Comments from the participants appear supportive. The three practitioners saw 
several benefits in the use of the Meta-notation. According to the software engineer:  
 
“The biggest advance that comes from using the Meta-notation is that the 
security issues are described at the beginning of the development and 
that these issues are not modeled too technically at the beginning of the 
development process.” [In addition, they stated that the Meta-notation 
was a useful tool for modeling the systems’ requirements.] 
 
Do the practitioners regard the method as feasible and practicable (Hypotheses 1(b), 
2(b), 3(b), 4(b) and 5(b))? Comments from the participants also appear supportive. For 
example, the practitioners commented that the Meta-notation was easy to learn in 
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general, although security classifications and terminology were difficult to understand. 
According to the software engineer: 
 
“Regarding ease of use, it makes no difference whether one employs use 
cases or abuse cases, and the abuse scenarios and abuse cases fitted 
well in the [RAD] process.” The technical expert commented: “It is always 
difficult to use new methods, especially when you are the first [in the 
organization] to do it, but I do not think that the use of this method is any 
harder than the use of some other method.” The software architect stated. 
“The abuse scenarios and abuse cases felt easy to learn […]. I find the 
security classifications difficult to understand and to realize how they 
should be used.” [The other dimensions (security policy and constraints) 
were easy to understand and apply in practice.] 
 
Was the modeling comprehensive (Hypothesis 2(a))? Comments from the field study 
appear supportive. For example, according to the technical expert:  
 
“It [the Meta-notation] works in the modeling done in the requirement 
stage. One has to stretch the standards [e.g., UML] a little, but that is not 
a problem.”  According to the software architect: “The method works well 
in the requirements stage and helps to move the collected information to 
the design stage. In the design stage the method [Meta-notation] provides 
a good tool for modeling the technical mechanisms of the 
countermeasures to be implemented.” 
And, again, according to the technical expert: “In those development 
stages where we used the Meta-notation, it worked well. Of course, the 
use of the Meta-notation required a bit of adapting and I’m sure that this 
will also be required in the future in different kinds of projects.” 
 
Were the developers able to use the method within their preferred approach 
(Hypotheses 3(a) and 4(a))? the software architect noted: 
 
“Generally the integration [of the Meta-notation] to our method was OK. 
… The information security policy defines different kinds of processes 
which are good to take into consideration during the development 
process. … The Meta-notation helps in describing the features which 
might become risks if they are ignored.” 
 
Did the developers feel that they could use the method in future, perhaps in other 
preferred methods or even methods yet to come (Hypotheses 4(a) and 5(a))? 
Comments from the participants are generally supportive. 
 
All developers agree that they would consider using this information 
security use case notation in future, as indicated by a developer: “Of 
course, with certain reserve. I would probably not use all of the six 
dimensions in every project. On the other hand, the dimensions [all six] 
are available when needed. It all depends on how much the client is 
willing to pay for security features.” Another developer commented: “Yes, 
I am sure that I will be using the method in future.”  
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The developers found the abuse scenarios and cases to be good tools for 
communicating with customers and top-level managers. As one developer commented:  
 
“In the requirement analysis stage, the abuse scenarios help in describing 
the operational environment in such a way that later in the process the 
[information security] requirements can be modeled and prioritized. The 
abuse subjects and abuse scenarios create a realistic vision of the 
mandatory security mechanisms which facilitate design.”   
 
Furthermore, other developers observed that the use of the Meta-notation improves the 
communication between the developers of Company B and its clients. The technical 
expert said:  
 
“Nowadays the test cases are planned based on use cases, and there are 
situations where it is not clear between the client and supplier [Company 
B] if the feature is a bug or an undefined feature. This can be avoided 
when the test cases are planned using abuse cases.”  
 
Areas for Future Improvement  
The use of the Meta-notation derived from the design theory was not without issues for 
Company B.  While in general the notation succeeded and the design project reached a 
successful conclusion, further research might focus on several potential adjustments. 
The developers did recognize some features that the Meta-notation failed to 
cover. For example, one of the developers said:  
 
“It would be good to have a risk analysis technique which helps to filter 
the achieved results (abuse cases, etc.) It would help one to concentrate 
on the right aspects and we could prepare for those aspects.” Another 
developer reported that, “Many information security features come from 
the architecture phase so it would be good to highlight the architectural 
aspects more clearly.”  
 
The practitioners saw that security classifications might be difficult to utilize in certain 
projects. The software engineer stated:  
 
“The classification of the information [security object] is at too low a level. 
The security classifications are useful in some specific industries, for 
example in defense forces; but in many cases they are redundant.” 
According to the software architect, “The method [Meta-notation] is good 
for specific use, but is not usable in all projects. I personally would use 
the classification of information only when required.” 
 
Ideas also surfaced after the project for further development of the Meta-notation. The 
software architect noted:  
 
“The [Meta-notation enriched RAD] process model should include 
information about responsibilities, what kind of skills the task requires, 
and what information is needed to complete that task, and define what the 
results are.”  
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That is, the Meta-notation should provide more guidance in the architectural verification 
stage. In addition, the technical expert saw a need to “…crosscheck the use cases and 
abuse cases [in order to improve the risk analysis process].” To minimize this gap, the 
practitioners created a matrix for that purpose. The practitioners also added their own in-
house risk management calculations methods to estimate risk, on the basis of which the 
abuse cases were prioritized. 
 
Discussion And Implications 
 
The meta-method contributes to the SIS literature by addressing the six meta-
requirements of our SIS design theory. First, most of the existing SIS design methods 
lack modeling support at the three levels of abstraction as required by meta-requirement 
2. Following the higher level of abstraction, we are led to propose the Meta-notation. In 
the example illustrated in this paper, the notation consists of six dimensions, which can 
be applied to different development situations at different levels of abstraction (and 
hence address the second SIS meta-requirement—to offer modeling support at the three 
levels of abstraction). However, this does not mean that one has to apply all six 
elements pro forma: developers can select from these six elements the relevant ones for 
the design setting.  
 
Second, only four prior SIS design methods are able to address the third meta-
requirement. That is, many of the existing SIS design methods cannot be integrated into 
ISD methods (the developmental duality problem). Our work indicates that the Meta-
notation can be added to existing notations for modeling IS or software. Within the new 
framework, it is possible to contextualize security-specific notation in existing and proven 
modeling notations. The theoretical framework indicates the combined modeling 
approach will allow security and functionality to be consistently modeled. The practical 
success of the clinical research solution supports this claim. 
 
Third, the framework and Meta-notation model take into consideration the autonomy of 
developers (the fourth meta-requirement). Developers need to independently exercise 
their contextualized preferences in selecting and using methods as a basis of ISD. 
Existing SIS design methods constrain this autonomy in developing SIS by limiting 
developers to independent secure development methods. The new framework adapts 
security design to the preferred methodology. The practical success collected from two 
cases also supports this facet of the theoretical frame. 
 
Fourth, there seems to be value in enabling systems design in organizations known to 
be emergent and evolving (the fifth meta-requirement). The Meta-notation framework 
may also address the constant need for novel methods, not just for security, but also for 
shifting purposes. Such methods need to be routinely modified by practitioners to fit 
regularly changing situations. In our fieldwork, the settings provide support for this claim. 
Finally, our general use of the design theory is at a level that Walls et al. (2004) 
characterize as “third level” usage (new insights are discovered as a result of the 
systematic use of design theory). After reviewing 26 articles that apply their idea of 
design theory, Walls et al. (2004 p. 56) point out that no previous study exemplified 
stage four. In our case, though, three observations/modifications involve elaboration of 
the original design theory.  These include the observation that product meta-
requirements are difficult to see in customized IS, the necessity for dividing design 
process hypotheses into two domains, and the necessity for adding process and 
notation to the design process aspects. This contribution may be seen to align with the 
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highest of four levels of design theory application, a level at which gaps are discovered 
in, and improvements are made to, the original design theory.  The work above 




IS and software development methods do not address security aspects seriously 
enough. As a result, many SIS design methods, from checklists to more advanced 
integrated IS design methods, have been established. However, these methods typically 
fail to meet five of the six SIS method meta-requirements, discovered through design 
theory. As a result, different SIS design methods cover different levels of IS, but each 
lacks the comprehensiveness needed for wider application. Most of the methods for 
designing SIS are difficult to integrate into ISD methods. Moreover, existing SIS design 
methods impair the autonomy of developers.  
 
A design theory leads to a Meta-notation that provides a framework for addressing these 
six meta-requirements and thus helps resolve the shortcomings of the known SIS design 
methods. This approach includes a Meta-notation for adding security into existing and 
future ISD methods. The Meta-notation has been validated in two practical settings with 
exactly these issues. The experience gained from these two action research settings 
demonstrates that the proposed Meta-notation is relevant, feasible, and easy to embed 
into normal ISD in a real-life setting. While the research shows that further work is 
needed, the design theory, and its Meta-notation framework, provides a promising 
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APPENDIX A: PRELIMINARY CLINICAL FIELDWORK DETAILS 
 
Company A is a film and production center aiming at facilitating regional film and media 
production. In 1999 Company A recognized the potential of the Web to support their 
business activities. Company A wanted to build a web-based database for scouting and 
infrastructure for the distribution of digital media to their customers through the Internet. 
To further improve their ISD practice as a means of achieving the aforementioned goals, 
Company A participated in a collaboration project between the University of Oulu and 
several other industrial organizations. Company A hired two software houses to develop 
parts of the functionality of the IS. Because Company A aimed to handle their business-
related activities (scouting database, distribution of digital products), through the 
Internet, there was a crucial need for addressing respective security concerns. 
 
The role of researchers in this part of the development was to support both Company A 
directly and one of the software companies hired by Company A to develop Company 
A’s systems. This software company followed an object-oriented modeling notation - 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) – as the basis of their ISD. However, based on the 
interviews, and observations on the design process and design documents in this 
company, the use of ISD methods and notation were rather informal, minimalist and 
solution-oriented. This means that developers were using only those parts of UML that 
they really needed in each project for the development of the IS or software. The 
software company was unable to address the security concerns by their current ISD 
method (UML) and practices:  
 
“We did not have such security methods as we have for normal ISD 
design and modeling … but the design and modeling techniques we are 
currently using ... concentrate on doing software. We don’t have a method 
which includes security aspects.” – a technical project manager of the 
company 
 
The company’s incentive for adaptation of this method was to fill this gap (the lack of 
notation support with respect to security aspects) in their ISD development practice. The 
experiences, opinions, and evaluations of the practitioners were recorded in interview 
sessions and design documents were reviewed. The action research followed a 
facilitative-clinical methodology without multiple cycles (Schein, 1987).  
 
Intervention 
First, the Meta-notation SIS method was introduced to the company. The idea was to 
use the Meta-notation enriched ISD method in the project. The project started with the 
creation of use cases: The researcher helped the practitioners convert the IS 
requirements into use cases. Then their experiences, opinions, and evaluations were 
recorded in an interview session. The next figure presents an example of the use of the 
notation in this project (Figure 14).  
 
Use case  Searching for work force. 
Version 1.0 
Functional summary Registered user access work force database in order to 
search for a suitable work force. 
Frequency Several times during the production planning. 
Usability requirements - 
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Actor/security subject A registered user from a production company 
Security classification of the 
subject 
Confidential 
Security objects and access 
types to security objects 
Security objects: Database (“Person” persistent objects) 
Access types: Actor/security subject can read the entire 
content of the work force database.  
Security policy/specific 
security restrictions 
Actor/security subject is not allowed to write or modify the 
contents of the work force database. 
Preconditions Work force database exists. Actor has been authenticated. 
Exceptions - 
Figure 14. A use case example from the project. 
 
In the example presented in Figure 14, registered users access a web-based database 
to search for the proper work force (functional summary). The actor/security subject is a 
registered user and the security classification is confidential. The actor/security subject 
can read the entire contents of the work force database (access types to security object). 
Figure 15 presents a modified example taken from the project. The notation is called “a 
second level use case” (as named by the software house). In Figure 15, there are two 
























can modify and 
store X, in 
addition to all 
things that also 
anonymous users 
can see/do   
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The elements of the archive X are security objects, and in this case, security objects are 
classified as confidential and public. Registered users are also allowed to modify and 
store X (security policy), while anonymous users are not.  
 
Results 
The preliminary study indicates that the design theory and the Meta-notation would hold 
in practice. Reflection represented by recorded comments of the collaborators indicated 
that the Meta-notation approach was feasible and practical (but not without limitations): 
 
The meta-notion was found very simple: “It was clear, some new lines 
were added into the diagrams”. In fact, an analyst expected the Meta-
notation to be “much more difficult” as “usually methods by academics are 
complex and hard to understand, but this use case notation was 
surprisingly clear”. All developers seemed to understand the terms: 
“Generally yes,” according to a developer, “but the concept of ‘Security 
Policy/Specific Security’ restrictions was the hardest”. 
Also one developer found the concept/dimension of ‘access types to 
security objects’ difficult at first sight: “At first it was hard to understand ... 
but after considering the example in the paper everything became clear in 
the end”. 
 
There were indications in the preliminary study that the modeling was comprehensive: 
The developers did not recognize that anything was missing from the 
Meta-notation. For example, one developer said, “Nothing was missing. I 
did not see anything lacking”, while another reported, “Well, I can't really 
say that anything was missing”, and  “I can't think of anything to add.” 
 
It appeared the notation helped acquire and document the security requirements, and 
the developers were able to use the method within their preferred approach: 
The developers regarded the meta-notion as very useful and relevant: 
“This is much smarter than the normal use case, whether for security use 
or not. These are of real use.” According to another developer, the Meta-
notation was “OK. Useful extra fields were added to it.” 
 
Also, the developers saw potential for future use of the method even in other preferred 
methods: 
All developers agree that they would consider use of this information 
security use case notation in future: "Yes, if there were need for security”. 
Another developer commented that: “Yes I would use it … immediately 
when we meet something with this kind of security requirements. This can 
be quite handy.” Another developer said “… it felt simple so I'm sure I 
would use it again if there is a need to address security aspects.” 
 
These representative results from the preliminary setting suggested strong support for 
the validity of the underlying SIS design theory: 
The overall evaluation of the Meta-notation by the technical project 
manager of the software company responsible for the development of the 
system was also positive, saying he “would give it eight out of ten.” An 
analyst in the same interview evaluated the Meta-notation as “10 out of 
10. We just add some lines into the notation and put the rest in there”. 
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APPENDIX B: ITERATION LOOP 3 IN COMPANY B 
 
The research design involved a nested set of action research iterations within the action 
taking phase of the Action Research study in Company B. Thus there were two sets of 
iterations in Stage 2 of the overall research project (See Figure 10). In this appendix, we 
will describe the action taking phase of Iteration 2 in more detail. This action taking 
phase involved an independent action research cycle all on its own, one in which the 
developers integrated the design theory’s Meta-notation into the company’s proprietary 
development method. There were three iterations of this inner action research loop 
(Iteration 3 in Figure 10). We refer to these as iterations 3.1 – 3.3.   
 
The action research team for this part of the research was different from the 
encompassing (Iteration 2) action research study in Stage 2. The team consisted of a 
researcher, an architect, a subject matter expert, and an engineer. 
 
Integration iteration 3.1 
 
In the first integration iteration, the dimensions of the Meta-notation were integrated into 
16 RAD process documents by the researchers. The integration was carried out one 
development phase at a time, starting from the requirement specification phase. In this 
iteration, attention was paid to ensuring that the transformation of information between 
different ISD stages was accurate and effective. For example, the security classifications 
of subjects and objects, the security policy and security constraints were integrated into 
a use case template (Figure 16). The abuse case document was created by using the 
use case template of the company and adding the abuse case specific fields (e.g., 
abuse subject, countermeasure, etc.) to this template. The abuse case template was 
then integrated into the same process document as the use cases. Additionally, the 
security classifications and constraints were integrated into the class description 
document and also into the architectural documents. To facilitate the use of the Meta-
notation enriched process documents, instructions on the use of the Meta-notation were 
also added to all documents. 
 
Purpose: What is the purpose of this use case? 
Priority: High / Medium / Low 
Frequency: How often this feature is used? 
Actor: User and user’s role in the system (=security subject).  
Classification of the 
actor: 
For example: Top secret, Secret, Confidential, Public 
Preconditions: What are the preconditions for this use case?  
Result: What is the result of this use case?  
Definition: The success scenario of this use case. 
Processed 
Information: 
The information entity processed in this use case (= security object).  
Classification of the 
object: 
For example: Top secret, secret, confidential, public   
Exceptions: Define alternative scenarios and exceptions.   
User’s rights: What are the user’s rights in this use case? Note that the user’s 
rights, also seen as security constraints, are more specific than the 
security classifications.  
Security policy: The security policy regarding this use case. 
Requirements: Links to specified requirements of this use case.  
Test cases: Links to specified test cases of this use case. 
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Figure 16. The Meta-notation enriched use case. The new SIS relevant fields 
(after iteration 1) are shown in italic font.   
 
Evaluation of the first integration iteration 
 
The authors collected feedback on these 16 Meta-notation enriched RAD process 
documents from seven practitioners: a technology manager, a business manager, a 
method specialist, two software architects and two managers. The practitioners wanted 
to separate the abuse cases from use cases in their own process documents. The 
practitioners also felt that the security classifications were not usable in their proposed 
form and location in the process documentation, and that the classifications were at the 
wrong level of abstraction. The R&D manager and the software architect requested the 
addition of more guidance on the use of Meta-notation, and the participants agreed that 
a process map could be useful in solving this guidance problem. Based on the ideas 
collected in this meeting, researchers continued to address these problems and 
proceeded with the integration in the second integration iteration. 
 
Integration iteration 3.2 
 
Based on the feedback, we modified 24 existing process documents and defined three 
new process documents. These new process documents were: unwanted functionality 
specification (abuse cases), the instruction on the use of Meta-notation in ISD, and the 
process map. The instruction document involved a simple example of the use of Meta-
notation in practice, and a proposal to collect the security classifications of subjects and 
objects in one matrix (Table 4). This matrix shows the classifications of subjects and 
objects and their security constraints. The unwanted functionality specification describes 
the abuse cases, based on the abuse scenarios developed in the RAD process. 
 
Table 4. The security classifications and constraints of an eCommerce system. 



























read - - - 
 
Based on the comments in the first iteration, we modified the process documents by 
removing the security classifications from the class level. We also integrated security 
classifications into the database design document. The abuse scenario and abuse 
subject were integrated into the operational environment document, and the security 
requirements were highlighted by categorizing them in their own security category in the 
requirements catalogue. Furthermore, the classification of the security subjects and 
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objects was moved to the information security design specification document. These 
modifications also led to a change in the way information was transformed between the 
process documents TPF12FPT, and updates were required in the auditing documents to 
correspond to the current version of the Meta-notation enriched RAD.   
 
During the second iteration, a document was developed to enable communication 
between the client organization’s management and Company B’s sales and project 
personnel. Abuse subjects and scenarios were integrated into the operational 
environment specification, because that document was already used (prior to this 
project) for communication purposes between Company B and its clients. The abuse 
scenarios provided, for example, written stories of possible compromises and how these 
could damage the IS. In accordance with critical comments from the ISD department 
manager, the orientation of the abuse scenarios was such that they could be understood 
by Company B’s sales personnel and clients, in order to communicate a general picture 
of SIS issues TPF13FPT.  
 
Evaluation of the second integration iteration 
 
After these modifications, a method specialist, a software architect and a system 
architect provided feedback on the modified process documents. They felt that the Meta-
notation terminology was rather academic and they wanted to change the terminology to 
correspond to the terms already used in the company: “We want to get rid of the 
academic terminology, and make the terminology more understandable for all 
developers.” – method specialist. The software architect continued: “The unwanted 
functionality document should be coherent with the functional specification [in terms of 
the language]. The abuse cases should be understandable and the metaphors should be 
the same as in the traditional use cases”.  
 
The practitioners also saw that the same information was presented twice in different 
documents. They saw that it is easier to update the documents when a developer only 
has to change the information in one process document. The practitioners were also 
satisfied with separating the security requirements into their own requirements category 
to highlight SIS features. Several previous problems were evaluated as solved: the 
treatment of abuse subjects, abuse scenarios and the instruction document on using 
Meta-notation enriched RAD and Meta-notation in software development. After collecting 
the feedback, analyzing the comments, we planned how to address the stated problems 




                                                 
TP
12
PT For example, the abuse subjects and scenarios are defined in the requirement specification phase. Later, 
in requirement analysis, that information is used to prioritize the information security requirements and to 
define the abuse cases. In the design and implementation phase, the information defined above is needed in 
designing the access control mechanisms and countermeasures to the abuse scenarios, and finally the SIS 
countermeasures are tested in the testing phase. All other information on SIS features (e.g., security 
constraints) must be associated similarly throughout the whole RAD process to ensure that the features will 
be implemented and tested correctly. 
TP
13
PT The document, including the abuse subjects and scenarios, works as a basis for describing abuse cases 
and prioritizing security requirements later in the ISD process.   
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Integration iteration 3.3 
 
In the third integration iteration, we modified 25 process documents, based on the 
feedback provided by the company’s practitioners in the second iteration. In this 
iteration, most of the changes were terminology-related: the terminology was 
harmonized with terminology used in the company. For instance, the practitioners of the 
company felt that it would better to use the term “role” or “actor” instead of “security 
subject”, to make the method easier to learn.   
 
The second concern mentioned during the second iteration concerned the maintenance 
of the documentation. We used a matrix to compile information from several documents, 
e.g., security classification of the subjects and objects (Boyseen and Eloff, 1995). By 
collecting the classification information into the information security plan document, it 
becomes easier to modify the information (Table 5). The practitioners objected to the 
security classifications and constraints matrix (Table 4) because it included too much 
information. When the IS is large, this table becomes unreadable. For example, as few 
as 100 objects and 20 actors would make this matrix (Table 4) so complex it would be 
difficult to understand. They recommended that it should be divided into two matrices 
(Table 5 and Table 6). This two-matrix solution requires fewer resources, since the 
modification of the information in the process documents would be centralized in a 
limited number of main process documents (e.g., the information security design 
specification). This centralization of information also improves the coherence within the 
overall documentation. After these modifications, we updated the links between the 
process documents.  
 
Table 5. The security classifications of the roles. 
User role Description Classification 
Role 1 Description of this user 
role 
The classification of the role 
Role 2 … (e.g., top secret / secret / confidential / 
public) 
Role …   
 
The security policy was modified during the third iteration.  It was clear to the 
practitioners that, at this point in the development, it is better to refer to a specific 
security requirement in the requirement catalogue than a client organization’s 
information security policy. According to the developers, the security policy may be 
generic, for example, drawn from BS7799. This modification is consistent with the Meta-
notation, since the aim of the Meta-notation was not to refer to an organizations’ high-
level security policy in use cases, but relevant sub-polices. 
 
The access matrix for the roles in the system was developed in this iteration to make the 
design and maintenance of access rights easier (Table 6). Through this matrix, one can 
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Table 6. The access matrix for the roles (C = create, R = read, U = update, D = 
delete). 
Processed information Role 1 Role 2 Role 3 Role … The needed 
operations 
object 1 CR RUD R R CRUD 
object 2 CRUD - - - CRUD 
object 3 RU RU R R RU 
 
After these modifications (Figure 17), we updated the transformation of information 
between the different process documents and delivered the documents to the company 
for evaluation.  
 
Purpose: What is the purpose of this use case? 
Priority: High / Medium / Low 
Frequency: How often is this feature used? 
Actor: User’s role in the IS (=security subject). Security classification defined 
in IS plan (see Table 3).  
Preconditions: What are the preconditions for this use case?  
Result: What is the result of this use case?  
Definition: The success scenario of this use case. 
Processed 
Information: 
The information entity processed in this use case (= security object). 
The functions needed are defined in IS plan (access matrix, see Table 
4).  
Exceptions: Define alternative scenarios and exceptions. Possible links to abuse 
cases.  
User rights: What are the user’s rights in this use case? The functions needed are 
defined in IS plan (access matrix, see Table 4). 
Requirements: Links to specified requirements of this use case.  
Test cases: Links to specified test cases of this use case. 
Figure 17. The final version of the Meta-notation enriched use case. Part of the 
information, such as security classifications of subjects and objects, is moved to 
Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Evaluation of the third integration iteration 
 
At the conclusion of this third iteration, the proposed method was harmonized with the 
terminology and practices used by the company. These modifications affected 25 
process documents. The developers were satisfied with the modifications and they 
decided that the method is ready for field test.  
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APPENDIX C: VALIDITY CRITERIA FOR IS ACTION RESEARCH 
 
The research described in this paper tests the practical success (relevance, feasibility 
and applicability) of the idea of Meta-notation by testing notation in practice in clinical 
and action research settings. A clinical research approach was selected initially because 
it is known to be the highly suitable for initial testing and possible adjustment of ISD 
methods.  
 
Seven validity criteria for IS action research results have been proposed (Baskerville and 
Wood-Harper 1998): (1) the research should be set in a multivariate social situation; (2) 
the observations should be recorded and analyzed in an interpretive frame; (3) there is 
researcher’s action that intervened in the research setting; (4) the method of data 
collection includes participatory observation; (5) changes in the social setting are 
studied; (6) the immediate problem in the social setting must have been resolved during 
the research; and (7) the research should illuminate a theoretical framework that 
explains how the actions led to a favourable outcome. These criteria are applied in 
evaluating the results of the intervention in the two companies. 
 
The research in this paper conforms to the seven validity criteria above. Regarding to 
the first criterion, the research in both cases was set in a multivariate social situation. 
The Company A case involved a complex relationship between an ISD contractor and 
their client. The client explicitly required a SIS. In the Company B case, the research 
was also carried out in a multivariate social situation, which included interaction between 
different stakeholders (e.g., practitioners of the company, management, researchers, 
etc.). 
 
Regarding second criterion, for both cases in companies A and B, the observations were 
recorded and analyzed within an interpretive research framework. Windows into this 
data and the interpretation have been provided in this report. With respect to third 
criterion, the researchers actively intervened in both companies; in the case of Company 
A, the researcher worked directly with the ISD contractor to introduce the Meta-notation 
into their practices. Similarly, in Company B case, the researchers’ actions intervened in 
the research setting by introducing a new method (Meta-notation) in the company. 
 
For the fourth criterion: the method of data collection in Company A included 
participatory observation as well as interviews. In the case of Company B, the data 
collection also included participatory observation in integration phase (action taking), but 
not in the empirical testing phase (evaluation). In this phase, the practitioners informed 
the researcher through e-mails, meetings, and by providing the documentation (e.g., 
specifications, design documents) from the project. 
 
As to the fifth criterion: in both cases, the outcome of the ISD process was assessed in 
terms of the collaborators’ reviews of the usability and success of the modified ISD 
method and the ISD modification process in different phases of the study. 
 
The sixth criterion is satisfied because the immediate problem in the research was 
resolved through integrating the Meta-notation to the ISD practices of companies A and 
B, according to the evaluation of the collaborators in the field.  
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Finally, regarding the seventh criterion, the actions in the settings were tightly linked to 
the Meta-notation theoretical framework. This framework defined the actions and 
explains clearly how the actions led to the favorable outcome. 
 
To summarize, the research experiences from two cases suggest that the Meta-notation 
was successful in practice. It was perceived to be relevant in use, feasible, and easily 
applied for extending normal ISD methods for secure purposes. This experience 
supports the design theory framework that drove the creation of the Meta-notation and 
its application for the purpose of creating SIS. While we do not specifically examine the 
satisfaction of the foregoing work in terms of criteria for design theory (e.g., Hevner, et 
al., 2004), there is evidence that work satisfying criteria for action research will 
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